Enforcing the rights and freedoms of disabled people: the role of transnational law (Part II) by Whittle, R. & Cooper, J.
Enforcing the rights and freedoms of disabled people: the 
role of transnational law (Part II)
WHITTLE, R. and COOPER, J.
Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at:
http://shura.shu.ac.uk/688/
This document is the author deposited version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.
Published version
WHITTLE, R. and COOPER, J. (1999). Enforcing the rights and freedoms of 
disabled people: the role of transnational law (Part II). Mountbatten journal of legal 
studies, 3 (1), 3-32.
Repository use policy
Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the 
individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print 
one copy of any article(s) in SHURA to facilitate their private study or for non-
commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or 
use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain.
Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive
http://shura.shu.ac.uk 
Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies Vol 3: No 1 (1999). 
 
 
 1 
 Enforcing the Rights and Freedoms 
 of Disabled People: the Role of Transnational Law (Part II) 
 
 Richard Whittle and Jeremy Cooper * 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In Part I of this article we examined the actual and potential application of global 
international law (GIL) to the development of rights and freedoms for people with disabilities. 
We concluded that there is currently no binding and accessible GIL instrument that 
specifically relates to this group.1  Instead, an emphasis was placed upon those instruments 
that have a generic application to human rights and a clear potential application to the 
protection of disability rights primarily through their provisions relating to non-discrimination. 
 Moreover, we stressed that the instruments of GIL also have the potential to provide an 
indirect benefit to disabled people as tools of influence and persuasion in the development of 
non-discrimination and affirmative action empowerment programmes at both a national and 
international level.    In Part II, we apply a similar analysis to the opportunities offered by 
European international law (EIL).  
  
2. European International Law (EIL) 
 
The most obvious difference between GIL and EIL is their relative geo-political 
spheres of influence. Whilst GIL applies in theory to the entire world, EIL is limited to those 
States of Europe that are members of the Council of Europe and/or the European Union.  
A more important difference, however, lies in the relative level of impact each body of 
law might have upon the rights and freedoms of disabled people.  In this respect, the 
continuing legislative and jurisprudential developments within the Council of Europe and the 
European Union coupled, in particular, with the pervasive nature of European Community 
Law, raise the potential of EIL to bring about positive change for people with disabilities 
within the European Region beyond that proffered by the GIL examined in Part I.   
Under the heading EIL, we distinguish between the instruments that have been 
developed under the auspices of the Council of Europe and those emanating from the 
European Union. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
* We would like to acknowledge both the patience and editorial skills of Ms Deirdre Waters in 
reviewing the many drafts of this paper. Any errors remain our own. 
 
1 While ILO Convention 159 concerning vocational rehabilitation and employment (disabled 
persons), 1983, specifically relates to people with disabilities and is binding upon its 
Contracting States, its provisions - like that of the other ILO Conventions -  cannot be 
described as accessible to the individual or groups of individuals in the manner described in 
Part I of this article.  
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2.1. Instruments emanating from the Council of Europe 
 
Independent of the European Community, the Council of Europe (established in 1948) 
is an international organisation comprising 40 Member States.  Through its Committee of 
Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly, the Council of Europe has, in addition to 
developing the three major binding instruments (discussed below), passed three non-binding 
instruments specifically relating to disability.2  These non-binding instruments provide a 
valuable insight into the approach and attitude of the Council of Europe to this area of human 
rights. In particular, Recommendation No.R (92) 6 on a coherent policy for people with 
disabilities, urges Member States of the Council of Europe to ‘guarantee the right of people 
with disabilities to an independent life and full integration into society, and [to] recognise 
society’s duty to make this possible’ so as to ensure ‘equality of opportunity’ for people with 
disabilities.  It further provides that to do otherwise would constitute a ‘violation of human 
dignity’.3 
Perhaps of greater significance, however, are the inferences that one may draw from 
such documents to clarify the possible application of certain provisions under the binding 
instruments that have emanated from the Council of Europe; documents such as the European 
Social Charters and the European Convention on Human Rights (discussed below).4 It should 
be noted that uncertainties exist both regarding the inclusion of disability within the 
protective remit of these instruments and, if included, the nature and extent of such coverage. 
 In this respect, encouragement may be gained from Recommendation 1185 (1992) where, in 
acknowledging the social nature of disability, it provides: 
 
'A disability is a restriction caused by physical, psychological, sensory, social, 
cultural, legal or other obstacles that prevent disabled people from becoming 
integrated and taking part in family life and the community on the same 
footing as everyone else.  Society has a duty to adapt its standards to the 
specific needs of disabled people in order to ensure that they can lead 
independent lives.' 
  
The three binding instruments of the Council of Europe to be reviewed in this 
article are as follows: 
                                                 
2
  See in this respect, Resolution AP (84), adopted on 7 September 1984 by the Committee of 
Ministers, on a coherent policy for the rehabilitation of handicapped people; 
Recommendation No. R (92)  6 adopted 9 April 1992 by the Committee of Ministers on a 
coherent policy for people with disabilities, and Recommendation 1185 (1992) adopted by the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 7 May 1992. 
 
3
 It is interesting to note in this respect that Recommendation 1185 (1992) invites the 
government of each Member State to describe what steps have been taken to comply with 
Recommendation No. R (92)6. 
 
4
  In Botta v. Italy, Judgement of 24 February 1998 (153/1996/772/973), for example, the Court 
of Human Rights made reference to Recommendation No. R (92) 6 of the Committee of 
Ministers and Recommendation 1185 (1992) ibid, while interpreting certain provisions under 
the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies Vol 3: No 1 (1999). 
 
 
 3 
  
 The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 
 The European Social Charter 1961 
 The European Social Charter (Revised) 1996 
 
2.1.1  European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 
(ECHR)  
 
The ECHR came into effect in 1953 and established a binding international standard 
of human rights that are primarily civil and political in nature; rights, therefore, closely 
mirroring those contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 
(ICCPR, see Part I).  Founded under the auspices of the Council of Europe, the ECHR 
places an obligation on its signatories to ensure that such rights are reflected at a national 
level and that a remedy is available from national courts in the event of a breach.  In addition 
to its binding nature, the ECHR can also be described as accessible to the individual as each 
of the Contracting States have voluntarily recognised the right to individual petition.5  
Be that as it may, the ECHR and its amending Protocols are limited in at least two 
respects.  The first limitation is that the Convention can only be enforced against a 
Contracting State and 'emanations thereof' 6 and does not, therefore, impose any direct 
obligations upon private individuals or organisations.7 A right of petition, however, is 
available to State parties, individuals and groups of individuals provided that the alleged 
violation concerns them directly.  Unfortunately, representative organisations or pressure 
groups that are not directly affected  by a State's actions but wish to litigate on behalf of 
nameless individuals will not have sufficient standing under the ECHR. Nevertheless, 
pressure groups are now regularly given an opportunity to submit amicus curiae briefs that 
can provide the Court of Human Rights with a broader picture against which to assess the 
details of an individual's claim. 
The second limitation is that, despite the incorporation of the ECHR in the majority of 
Contracting States, there will still be occasions necessitating application proceedings to the 
Commission of Human Rights.  However, such an application - which may then be passed 
on to the Court of Human Rights - can only take place once all domestic remedies have been 
exhausted and the procedure, therefore, to bring an infringing State before the Court of 
Human Rights is both time-consuming and expensive.8  
                                                 
5
  An increase in accessibility will be achieved through the implementation of Protocol No. 11.  This 
amendment will reduce the political influence that is currently exerted when an application under the 
Convention is being considered in terms of its 'admissibility'. 
 
6
  For an examination of what may be considered an emanation of the State under European Community 
law, see V Kvjatkoviski, 'What is an Emanation of the State? An Educated Guess', 3 European Public 
Law, 1997, 3, 329.  It is submitted that one can draw similar inferences in this respect to the ECHR 
and its application. 
 
7
  It should be noted that the protected rights under the Convention can also have an indirect influence on 
the rights of individuals in the 'private' sphere; a possibility recently confirmed in Botta v. Italy, infra. 
8
 Financial assistance, however, can be sought from the Commission's own financial support facility. 
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 4 
Despite these limitations, the ECHR, its Protocols, and the developing associated 
jurisprudence, provide a promising foundation to further advance the rights and interests of 
people with disabilities within Contracting States.  While neither the Convention nor its 
Protocols specifically address questions pertaining to disability, it is clear that neither do they 
specifically exclude the application of disability rights from their consideration.9 
As regards the right to non-discrimination, the relevant provision under the ECHR can 
be found in Article 14.  This article lists a number of prohibited grounds of discrimination 
and concludes with the words 'or other status', thus: 
 
'The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any grounds such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status (Emphasis added).'  
 
The following points should be made in relation to this provision. Firstly, due to the inclusion 
of the words 'set forth in this Convention', Article 14, in contrast to Article 26 ICCPR, cannot be 
pleaded in isolation.  It prohibits discrimination only in respect of one or more of the other rights 
and freedoms enshrined within the Convention and cannot, therefore, be described as 'autonomous'. 
The extent of this limitation on Article 14 is fully appreciated when one considers that its lack of 
autonomy will prevent the Court of Human Rights from considering issues relating to 
non-discrimination if the facts of a given case do not fall within another article's remit of 
application.10  It is worth noting, therefore, that one should not interpret Article 14 as being 
inherently inapplicable to people with disabilities merely because the Court of Human Rights has 
failed to consider this article in previous cases brought by such applicants.11 
Secondly, the use of the words 'on any grounds such as' renders Article 14, like Article 
26 of the ICCPR (see Part I), 'open-ended' and it therefore prohibits any distinction on any 
ground unless 'a reasonable and objective justification' can be made by the State concerned.  
Moreover, the indication from the case law in this respect is that, in assessing the justification 
made by the defendant Contracting State, the Court of Human Rights will look to see whether 
the distinction is in pursuance of a 'legitimate aim' and whether or not there is a 'reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be 
realised'.12   
Thirdly, it is possible that the Court of Human Rights may interpret Article 14 - and 
                                                 
9
 Similarities can be drawn in this respect with the ICCPR and the ICESCR, examined in Part I of this 
article. 
 
10
 See  Karheinz Schmidt v. Germany judgment of 18 July 1994, Series A no. 291-B, p. 32, para 22.  
Equal to the position, therefore, in respect of Article 2(2) of the ICESCR.  Note that although the right 
to non-discrimination in Article 14 has no independent existence, breach of this article can make 
unlawful what might otherwise be lawful in terms of the other rights guaranteed by the Convention; see, 
for example, Case of Larkos v. Cyprus judgment of 18 February 1999 (application no. 29515/95), and 
the Belgian Linguistics case 1 EHRR 252. 
 
11
 One example in this respect is the case of Botta v. Italy, examined below. 
 
12 Gaygusuz v. Austria judgement of 16 September 1996 (39/1995/545/631), para 42. 
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its application - in the same way that it has interpreted Article 8 of the Convention (see 
below). Such an interpretation would therefore impose a duty upon Contracting States to 
introduce positive State action (distinct from affirmative action measures) to ensure 
compliance with the right to non-discrimination.13  The potential impact of such a duty on 
the rights and freedoms of people with disabilities (an impact that may even extend to the 
private sphere) has previously been identified in relation to Article 26 ICCPR (see Part I).  It 
should be noted, however, that due to Article 14's lack of autonomy, such a duty will only 
apply within the context, or remit of application, of the other rights and freedoms protected by 
the ECHR and its protocols.   
In terms of affirmative action measures, it is unlikely that Article 14 would be 
interpreted as imposing a positive duty upon the State for the introduction of such measures 
that, by their very nature, discriminate in favour of a protected group.   Nevertheless, this 
would not prevent an acceptance of affirmative action measures under the Convention as 
Article 14, like Article 26 ICCPR, will only prohibit State action if it cannot be 'reasonably 
and objectively justified'. Given the purpose behind affirmative action measures, it is difficult 
to foresee circumstances that would prevent such a justification being established in defence 
of State action that favours under-represented groups; groups that would therefore include 
people with disabilities.   
The inadequacy, however, of non-discrimination provisions such as Article 14 
becomes most salient when one considers that the present jurisprudence under this Article 
requires inequality of treatment before discrimination is said to exist.14 Thus, a government 
measure introducing an employment policy that treats all people equally but fails to 
compensate for the existence of disability and, as a result, has an adverse impact on disabled 
people, would not fall foul of Article 14 ECHR.  It would appear, therefore, that Article 14 
does not demand anything over and above the concept of 'formal equality' and, as a 
consequence, will be of limited value in combating 'indirect' forms of discrimination; forms 
constituting the majority of disability discrimination cases. This apparent limitation is also 
reflected in the European Social Charters (see below), and the ICCPR (see Part I).  
Moreover, with the exception of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 1966 (ICESCR, see Part I), doubt also surrounds the relevance of 'reasonable 
accommodation' to the application of the non-discrimination principle in these treaties.  An 
announcement, therefore, by the relevant treaty committees clarifying these issues would 
clearly be a positive step in the right direction.15 
                                                 
 
13
 See, for example, Botta v. Italy examined below and Airey v. Ireland, op cit.   A similar 
interpretation has been placed upon both the ICCPR and the ICESCR; see in this respect the 
discussion surrounding Article 2(2) of the ICCPR and the General Comment No. 5 by the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in respect of Article 2(2) of the ICESCR 
in Part I of this article. 
 
14
 See Observer and Guardian v. UK 14 EHRR 153. 
 
15
 It should be noted in this respect that a working group within the Council of Europe is 
currently revising the scope of application of Article 14 ECHR and it is hoped that its 
limitations and uncertainties, as identified herein, will be fully addressed in any forthcoming 
amendments to the non-discrimination provision. 
Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies Vol 3: No 1 (1999). 
 
 
 6 
Nonetheless, despite these limitations, a number of articles exist within the ECHR and 
its Protocols that would arguably provide the necessary scope for challenging State practice 
and laws both independently of, and in conjunction with, Article 14.  Thus, by applying the 
facts of a recent case in the United Kingdom, the following discussion aims to demonstrate 
the potential of the Convention, its Protocols, and other relevant instruments of the Council of 
Europe in both protecting and advancing the rights and freedoms of people with disabilities.  
In ex parte Barry,16 the House of Lords held by a majority decision that local 
authorities may take their resources into consideration when determining which 'needs' 
necessitate intervention in respect of the disability support services listed under s2 of the 
Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970 (CSDPA).  As a result of this decision, Mr 
Barry no longer receives assistance with shopping, laundry, cleaning and collecting his 
pension.  Given that the absence of such services would make it very difficult for Mr Barry 
to remain in his home, one may argue that the cessation of 'community care' has 
constructively violated Article 8(1) ECHR, which provides: 
 
'Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence (Emphasis added).' 
 
Clarification in respect of Article 8 and its potential application to the rights and 
freedoms of disabled people has been provided by a recent decision of the Court of Human 
Rights.  In Botta v. Italy,17 a disabled applicant sought to compel the Italian Government to 
ensure the realisation of a national law that would consequently require the removal of the 
barriers preventing the applicant from gaining access to a private beach.  While the applicant 
in Botta was unsuccessful, there are three main elements that can be extracted from this 
decision which are relevant to future applications under Article 8 ECHR. 
In terms of the first element, the Court reiterated that the meaning of the words 
'private.. life' in Article 8 (1) should encompass, inter alia, an individual's 'physical and 
psychological integrity'.  In the context of ex parte Barry, therefore, this interpretation would 
arguably include the ability of an individual to be as 'independent' as possible.  Such 
independence would encourage integration into community and family life and, as a 
consequence, play a critical part in an individuals 'physical and psychological integrity'.  The 
need for independence and its potential impact upon an individual's 'integrity', and therefore 
'private.. life', is readily apparent from the issues arising in ex parte Barry.  
Secondly, the Court confirmed that, while primarily intended to protect the individual 
against arbitrary interference by public authorities, Article 8(1) may also impose 'positive 
obligations inherent in effective respect for private or family life'.18 In the context of ex parte 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
16
  R v. Gloucestershire County Council, ex parte Barry [1997] 2 ALL ER 1; [1997] 2 WLR 459  
(HL). 
 
17
 Judgement of 24 February 1998 (153/1996/772/973). 
18
 Moreover, the Court confirmed that such obligations may involve the adoption of measures 
designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations between 
individuals. See also in this respect, X and Y v. the Netherlands, 26 March 1985, Series A no. 
91, p. 11, para  23.  The latter concerned the rape of a mentally handicapped person and 
accordingly related to her physical and psychological integrity.  The offence had occurred 
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Barry, one may assume that because the applicant had satisfied the eligibility criteria for 
disability support services, the obligation at issue would be the continued provision of those 
services; a State obligation, therefore, that is positive in nature. 
Thirdly, in striking a fair balance between the general interest and the interests of the 
individual, the Court stated that such obligations would only exist where a direct and 
immediate link is established between the measures sought, and the applicant's private and/or 
family life.  On the facts of Botta, however, it was held that the actual right sought by the 
applicant: 
 
'…concerned interpersonal relations of such broad and indeterminate scope 
that there could be no conceivable direct [and immediate] link between the 
measures which the State was urged to take in order to make good the 
omissions of the private bathing establishments and the applicant's private 
life19 (Emphasis added).' 
 
The direct and immediate link requirement would, therefore, appear to limit the 
application of Article 8 (1) both in terms of the 'sphere of human relations' at issue and the 
extent to which the act or omission in question 'directly affects' the private/family life of the 
applicant.  It is submitted however that, in the context of Botta, an overly narrow 
interpretation was placed upon this requirement. Such an interpretation is particularly difficult 
to accept in light of the definition of disability provided by the Council of Europe itself in 
paragraph 3 of Recommendation 1185.  This definition clearly acknowledges the link 
between obstacles, such as those in Botta, preventing people with disabilities becoming:  
 
'...integrated and taking part in family life and the community on the same 
footing as everyone else[,]...' 
 
and therefore creating the disability itself, and society's duty to remove those obstacles by 
 
'...[adapting] its standards to the specific needs of disabled people in order to ensure 
that they can lead independent lives.' 20  
 
Moreover, it is arguable that had the applicant in Botta been denied access to the beach on the 
basis of gender or race - grounds classified as 'internationally suspect' - it is unlikely that the Court of 
                                                                                                                                                        
while the applicant was being cared for in the private sector. 
 
19
 Op cit., para 35.  X and Y, ibid, provides a contrast to the reasoning in Botta.  It was held in 
X and Y that the government of Netherlands, due to the shortcomings of the Dutch Criminal 
Code, had not afforded the applicant with practical and effective protection against the offence 
in question (p. 14,  para 30) and, as a result, a direct and immediate link had been established 
between the measure sought by the applicant and her private and/or family life. 
20
 A requirement that is also reflected in Recommendation No. R (92)6 on a coherent policy for 
people with disabilities (discussed above).  Moreover Recommendation No. R (92)6 clearly 
provides that a failure by society to adapt its standards in this respect, would constitute a 
'violation of human dignity'. 
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Human Rights would have placed such a restrictive interpretation upon this requirement. This would 
suggest, therefore, that either people with disabilities have been accorded a second class right to 
equality under the Convention, or the Court was simply not aware of the social nature of disability.21 
Be that as it may, irrespective of the interpretation placed upon the direct and immediate link 
requirement, we suggest that the facts of ex parte Barry clearly satisfy such a link; i.e. between the 
measures sought by Mr Barry (the continuation of care and home help) and the right to respect for his 
private/family life and his home (the option of independent living).22 
A further argument on the facts of ex parte Barry could be based upon Article 1 of the First 
Protocol to the ECHR which states that: 
 
'Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions...'  
 
This article has been interpreted to include within its meaning the provision of a 'welfare 
benefit' as a 'pecuniary right' once the eligibility criteria for such benefits (which must also be in 
accordance with the ECHR) have been satisfied.23 In the context of ex parte Barry, it is arguable that 
as Mr Barry had previously satisfied the eligibility criteria for disability support services under s2 
CSDPA he should, as a result, be entitled to the provision of such services as a 'pecuniary right', i.e. a 
right within the protective remit of Article 1 of the First Protocol.   
One should note, however, that in defending an action under the ECHR or its Protocols a 
State may have recourse to its margin of appreciation; a concept that is capable of placing a 
qualification upon the rights contained therein.  On the facts of ex parte Barry, therefore, a 
government could attempt to justify the decision as being in the interests of: 
'the economic well-being of the country (Article 8(2)) 
 
and/or 
 
in accordance with [inter alia] the general interest... (Article 1(2) First 
Protocol)...' 
 
As the decision to discontinue the provision of disability support services in ex parte 
Barry was essentially based on economic reasoning made in a climate of limited resources 
and arguably, therefore, in accordance with both the 'economic well-being of the country' and 
the 'general interest' of the nation, the above qualifications may preclude a favourable 
outcome for Mr Barry under the Convention.  Be that as it may, the margin of appreciation 
attributed to a State must always be tempered by 'the circumstances, the subject matter [of the 
                                                 
21
 For a distinction between the 'social' and 'medical' model of disability, see infra at f.n. 28.  
 
22
 Note that in addition to X and Y, op cit., a direct and immediate link has been found to exist in Airey v. 
Ireland, 9 October 1979, Series A no. 32; Lopez Ostra v. Spain (mutatis mutandis, 9 December 1994, 
Series A no. 303-C) and Guerra and Others v. Italy, 19 February 1998 (mutatis mutandis, Reports of 
Judgements & Decisions 1998).  Common to each of these cases, is the intimacy between the 
act/omission in question and the private or family life of the applicant; an intimacy that arguably existed 
in Botta. 
 
23
 See Gaygusuz v. Austria, 16 September 1996 (39/1995/545/631). 
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right in question] and its background'.24 In respect of ex parte Barry therefore, it is interesting 
to note the priority given to disability support services by the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe in Recommendation No. R (92) 6 on a coherent policy for people with 
disabilities.  This recommendation states at paragraph 4 under the heading 'General Policy': 
 
'...it is important to ensure that sufficient financial resources are available in 
order to overcome the disadvantages affecting people with disabilities.' 
 
Moreover, at paragraph 1.3 under the heading 'Social, Economic and Legal Protection', 
the Recommendation continues: 
 
'Socio-economic protection must be ensured by financial benefits and social 
services.  This protection must be based on a precise assessment of the needs 
and situation of people with disabilities.'  
 
In light of the importance attached by this Recommendation to the provision of 
disability benefits and services,25 and the argument that disability support services - such as 
that in dispute in ex parte Barry - can and should be provided as of right,26 a strong 
counter-argument could be made against a defence based upon the above qualifications to the 
rights in the Convention.  Moreover it should also be noted that, as a concept, the State's 
'margin of appreciation' is likely to be given a strict interpretation in the context of those 
grounds of discrimination that have been accorded the classification as being 'internationally 
suspect', a classification that should arguably include disability (see Part I). 
As to the right of non-discrimination in Article 14 ECHR and its possible application 
to the facts of ex parte Barry, difficulty exists in attempting to use this provision in 
conjunction with the above Articles as it requires inequality of treatment to be established 
between individuals or groups of individuals placed in comparable situations.27 Given that 
the 'services' listed under s2 of the CSDPA are only available to disabled people, the 
identification of any 'less favourable treatment' in comparison with a non-disabled person is 
clearly problematic.   
Article 14 may, however, prohibit discrimination existing between the various subsets 
                                                 
24
  See Inze v. Austria 28 October 1987, Volume 126, Series A, at para 41.  Note also that 
consideration of the individual interest at issue or the 'nature of the activities involved' will 
affect the scope of the margin of appreciation, see in this respect, Dudgeon v. The U.K, 22 
October 1981, Volume 45, Series A, European Court of Human Rights, at para 52. 
 
25
 Further support in this respect can be found in the preamble to Rule 4 of the UN Standard 
Rules on the Equalisation of Opportunities for People with Disabilities (see Part I) which 
provides: ‘States should ensure the development and supply of support services including 
assistive devices for persons with disabilities, to assist them to increase their level of 
independence in their daily living and to exercise their rights (Emphasis added).’ 
 
26
 See in this respect, R Whittle, 'The Question of Resources and the Application of Disability 
Rights', 6 Health Care Analysis, 1998, 3, 227. 
 
27
 See , Sunday Times v. UK Series A, Vol. 30. 
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of disabilities and the weight accorded to them in the provision of disability benefits and 
support services.  Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the case law under the ECHR indicates 
that the non-discrimination provision found in Article 14 of the Convention will only prohibit 
distinctions that are not based upon 'reasonable' and 'objective' criteria (the 'justification 
defence').  Consequently, while the assessment criteria for the provision of such benefits and 
services are based upon the 'medical model' of disability28 and arguably, therefore, grounded 
upon an 'essentialist' ideology that devalues the lives of people with disabilities,29 it is 
unlikely that the Court of Human Rights would find it in breach of the Convention given the 
present format of Article 14.30 
Beyond the facts presented in ex parte Barry and the articles discussed above, it is 
clear that while each of the remaining articles under the Convention and its Protocols relate to 
both able-bodied and disabled people,31 the following provisions are likely to have particular 
relevance to people with disabilities: 
 
'No one shall be subject to...degrading treatment... (Article 3 -Emphasis 
added).'  
 
It has been held that discrimination based on race may itself amount to 'degrading 
treatment'.32 Potentially, therefore this application of Article 3 may also extend to include 
disability based discrimination. 
 
'Everyone has the right to liberty and security of the person (Article 5 - Emphasis 
                                                 
28
 The 'medical' model of disability focuses on the physical or sensory impairments of the 
individual and the definition of disability is largely based on that contained in the WHO, 
International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps, Geneva: WHO, 1980. 
 In contrast, the 'social' model views the existence of disability as stemming from significant 
barriers in the social and built environment; see M Oliver, (ed.) 'Social Work: Disabled People 
and Disabling Environments, Jessica Kingsley', London, 1991.  One should note, however, 
that the classification provided by the WHO is currently under revision and early drafts 
demonstrate a clear recognition of the 'social model' of disability. 
 
29
 See in this respect, J Branson and D Miller, 'Beyond Integration Policy - The Deconstruction 
of Disability. In L Barton (ed.) 'Integration: Myth or Reality'?, Falmer, London, 1989. 
 
30
 This point needs to be tackled at both a social and political level.  Reliance should not be 
placed, at least within the United Kingdom and New Zealand, upon existing domestic legal 
structures to address this issue in a satisfactory way.  See in this respect, R Whittle, 'The 
Question of Resources and the Application of Disability Rights', supra. 
 
31
 See, for example X and Y v. the Netherlands, discussed op cit, and Obermeier case, 28 June 
1990 (6/1989/166/222).  In the latter, it was held that the Disabled Persons Board and 
Provincial Governor of Austria did not constitute independent tribunals for the purposes of 
Article 6(1).  The lack of an effective review of these bodies, therefore, constituted a 
violation of the right of access to a court under Article 6(1). 
 
32
 East African Asians v. UK (1994) 78-A D & R 5, at para 207. 
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added)'33 
 
'Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a 
family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right 
(Article 12 - Emphasis added).'  
 
'No person shall be denied the right to education (Article 2, First Protocol - 
Emphasis added)' 
 
'Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, 
have the right to liberty of free-movement and freedom to choose his residence 
(Article 2(1), Fourth Protocol - Emphasis added).' 
 
Once incorporated into domestic law, either by national statute (in a dualist legal 
system) or by virtue of ratification by the State (in a monist legal system), the ECHR will 
provide self-executing rights to individuals within the territory of a State Party.  Disabled 
individuals within those Contracting States will therefore be able to enforce their rights under 
the ECHR before national courts and tribunals and, in this respect, may refer to relevant 
national decisions interpreting the Convention, the judgements by the Court of Human Rights, 
and relevant Convention sources such as the Recommendations and Resolutions discussed 
earlier in this paper.  
 
 
2.1.2. The European Social Charters 34 
Although binding upon State signatories, the European Social Charter 1961 (ESC 
1961) does not provide a facility for individual complaints.  The incorporation of a mere 
supervisory mechanism (discussed in Part I) while valuable, will not, on its own, render the 
treaty accessible to the individual.  Moreover, given that all but one of the rights enshrined 
within the ESC 1961 are 'non-justiciable' in nature, it is clear that they will not produce 
self-executing rights, i.e. rights enforceable before national courts.35 It should be noted, 
however, that disability Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Contracting States that 
have signed the 1995 Additional Protocol to the ESC 1961 (providing for a system of 
collective complaints) are now able to submit complaints regarding breaches under the ESC 
1961 directly to the Committee of Independent Experts (the body presiding over the 
Charter).36 
                                                 
33
 The application of the rights protected under the ECHR, in particular Article 5, to people with 
mental illness is examined in O Thorold, 'The Implications of the European Convention on 
Human Rights for the United Kingdom Mental Health Legislation', 6 European Human Rights 
Law Review 1996, 619. 
34
 For a brief discussion on the actual and potential impact of both the European Social Charter 
1961 and the European Social Charter 1996 (Revised), see A Heringa, 'Editorial', 4 Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law, 1997, 2, 107. 
 
35
 Arguably the right to strike under Article 6(4) of the ESC 1961 has self-executing effect. 
 
36
 For an examination of the additional protocol to the ESC 1961, see R Brillat, 'A New Protocol 
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While the Revised European Social Charter 1996 (ESC(R) 1996)37 incorporates new 
and more progressive provisions, many of which can be analysed both in terms of 'civil and 
political' and 'social and economic' rights, it does not provide a facility for individual 
complaints and will not, therefore, be any more accessible than the ESC 1961.  
Consequently, the Social Charters will place little more than a political or moral obligation 
upon governments of Contracting States that operate a dualist legal system and have not, at 
present, enacted a national statute to incorporate either the ESC 1961 or the ESC(R) 1996.  
In this context, therefore, similarities may be drawn with the non-binding instruments 
examined in Part I. Although it should be noted that certain provisions of the ESC(R) 1996 
are arguably capable of providing self-executing rights to nationals within those Contracting 
States operating a monist legal system; rights that may therefore be pleaded directly before 
national courts or tribunals.38 
Encouragement as to the potential future role of the Social Charters in the sphere of 
human rights may be gained from various sources that together indicate an increase in both 
the profile and possible application of the rights protected within these Charters.  Thus, 
within the remit of the Council of Europe, the Court of Human Rights has referred to the ESC 
1961 - during its deliberations - in developing the indivisible link between the 'civil and 
political rights' protected by the ECHR and the 'social and economic rights' protected by the 
ESC 1961 (rights recently been expanded in the ESC(R) 1996).39 In relation to the European 
Community, the increasing importance of the ESC 1961 and the growing awareness of a need 
for a 'social Europe'40 is both re-enforced in the new fourth paragraph of the Preamble to the 
Maastricht Treaty, and manifest in the introduction of a new Chapter IV on Social Policy in 
Section II of the Amsterdam Treaty.  Together, therefore, with the justiciable nature of many 
of the new provisions within the ESC(R) 1996 and the global recognition of the indivisible, 
interdependent, and interrelated nature of both 'social and economic' and 'civil and political' 
                                                                                                                                                        
to the European Social Charter Providing for Collective Complaints', 1 European Human 
Rights Law Review, 1996, 52. At present, the United Kingdom has neither signed nor ratified 
it. 
 
37
 The ESC(R) 1996 entered into force on the 1st July 1999. It required at least three ratifications 
before it could take effect.  To date it has received four ratifications (France, Romania, 
Slovenia, and Sweden) and nineteen signatures (including the United Kingdom).  These State 
signatories are now Contracting States to the ESC(R) 1996. 
 
38
 See, for example, the non-discrimination provision in Article E (discussed below). 
 
39
 See for example, Lopez-Ostra, judgement of 9 December 1994, Series A, vol. 303-C and 
Sigurdur A. Sigurjonsson, judgement of 30 June 1993, Series A, vol. 264.  It should be noted 
that these references were made despite the inability of a complainant to invoke the provisions 
of the ESC 1961 in application proceedings under the ECHR.  For an interesting discussion 
concerning the protection of social and economic rights through treaties on civil and political 
rights, see M Scheinin, 'Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights' in A Eide, C Krause and 
A Rosas (ed.) 'Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook', Martinus Nijhoff, 
Dordrecht, 1994, 44-62. 
 
40
 See in this respect, B Bercusson et al, 'A Manifesto for Social Europe', 3 European Law 
Journal, 1997, 2, 189. 
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rights,41 these sources indicate that the Social Charters are likely to play a valuable role in 
protecting the rights and interests of disadvantaged social groups - such as disabled people - 
in future years.  
One apparent limitation of the European Social Charters, however, is the failure of the 
non-discrimination provisions in both the ESC 1961 and the ESC(R) 1996 to expressly 
include disability within their protective remit.42 Thus, the preamble to the ESC 1961 
provides: 
 
'the enjoyment of social rights should be secured without discrimination on 
grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or 
social origin.' 
 
Moreover, despite being more extensive, the expatiation of the grounds of 
discrimination contained in Article E of the ESC(R) 1996 also fails to specifically include 
disability within its coverage, thus: 
 
'The enjoyment of the rights set forth in this Charter shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national extraction or social origin, health, 
association with a national minority, birth or other status. (Emphasis added).' 
 
It is likely, however, that this limitation - like that of the non-discrimination 
provisions in the other treaties identified above and in Part I - is more apparent than real.  
Given that Article E of the ESC(R) 1996 is largely a codification of the understanding that the 
Committee of Independent Experts has placed upon the non-discrimination principle in the 
preamble to the ESC 1961, the following points can be made in respect of both Social 
Charters and their operation. 
The first point is that neither of the non-discrimination provisions in the Social 
Charters can be described as autonomous due to the inclusion of the words 'set forth in this 
Charter' in Article E of the ESC(R) 1996.  Equal, therefore, to the position under Article 14 
of the ECHR and Article 2 (2) of the ICESCR, the non-discrimination provisions in the 
Social Charters will only prohibit discrimination in respect of one or more of the other rights 
protected within their respective remit of application. 
The second point concerns the Annex under Article E of the ESC(R) 1996 which 
provides: 
 
'A differential treatment based on an objective and reasonable justification 
shall not be deemed discriminatory.' 
 
Coupled with the words 'on any grounds such as' within Article E of the ESC(R) 1996, 
its Annex would therefore suggest that the non-discrimination provisions within the Social 
                                                 
41
 See, The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 1993. 
 
42
 A similar limitation has previously been identified in respect of Article 26 of the ICCPR and 
Article 2 (2) of the ICESCR (examined in Part I) and Article 14 ECHR (see above). 
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Charters prohibit any distinction on any ground unless 'an objective and reasonable 
justification' can be made by the State concerned.  Equal to the interpretation placed upon 
Article 26 ICCPR and Article 14 ECHR, the non-discrimination provisions in the Social 
Charters would therefore appear to be 'open-ended' and, as a consequence, prohibit 
disability-based discrimination unless an objective and reasonable justification can be 
established by the defendant State.  This 'justification defence' would arguably allow for the 
introduction of 'affirmative action measures' for groups - such as disabled people - that have 
historically suffered from de facto forms of discrimination.43  
It should be noted however that, prima facie, the non-discrimination provisions within 
the Social Charters do not place a positive obligation on Contracting States to introduce 
legislation to ensure that the rights protected by the Social Charters are not violated.  This is 
in contrast, therefore, to the relevant provisions under both the ICCPR and the ICESCR 
(discussed in Part I) and the interpretation that may be placed upon Article 14 ECHR by the 
Court of Human Rights (see above). 
The third point is that - like Article 14 ECHR and Article 26 of the ICCPR - it is 
unclear, at present, whether the right to non-discrimination within the Social Charters will 
prohibit 'indirect' forms of discrimination and whether or not this right would encompass the 
concept of 'reasonable accommodation'.  A similar statement, therefore, to that made by the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under the ICESCR (see Part I) would 
provide much needed clarification in this respect. 
While the absence of an express inclusion of disability in the non-discrimination 
provisions under the ICCPR, the ICESCR (see Part I), the ECHR and the ESC 1961, arguably 
reflects the age of these documents, difficulty exists in extending this justification to the 
ESC(R) 1996.  In the event that the Committee of Independent Experts adopt a different 
approach to that of both the Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR and the Court of 
Human Rights under the ECHR - in not interpreting the non-discrimination provisions under 
the Social Charters as being 'open-ended' - reliance would have to be placed upon the 
non-exhaustive nature of the words 'or other status' in Article E of the ESC(R) 1996'.  These 
words would therefore leave open the possible inclusion of 'disability' within the protective 
remit of the non-discrimination provisions of both Social Charters.  Further encouragement 
in this respect may be gained from the commitments contained within the non-binding 
instruments pertaining to disability that have emanated from the Council of Europe (see 
above).  
  Alternatively, one should note that the specific reference to the word 'health' in the 
ESC(R) 1996 can clearly have relevance to people with disabilities44 albeit limited, prima 
facie, in its application to matters relating to the 'medical' model of disability. Moreover, a 
more purposive interpretation of the term 'health' might evolve through decisions by the 
Committee of Independent Experts in light of the definition of disability contained within 
                                                 
43
 It should be noted that affirmative action measures may also be allowed under the ICESCR’s 
non-discrimination provision (Article 2(2)) when read in light of the General Comment on disability 
issued by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (see Part I). 
44
 It is the opinion of Wolfgang Peukert (Head of Case-Law and Research Unit, European 
Commission of Human Rights, Council of Europe, Strasbourg) 'that disability could 
undoubtedly be subsumed under [the terms] health or other status' (letter to author, 03.02.98). 
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paragraph 3 of Recommendation 1185 (1992); a definition that is reflective of the 'social' 
model of disability.  Such an interpretation has already been provided elsewhere in the 
context of the term  'health' under Article 12 ICESCR45 and the new Article 137 of the 
European Community treaties.46 This interpretation extends beyond matters relating to its 
medical component and could equally apply to Article E of the ESC (R) 1996.  However, if 
the non-discrimination provisions within the Social Charters are not considered to be 
'open-ended' it is likely that, until such clarification exists in relation to the term 'health', the 
phrase 'or other status' will provide a more appropriate provision for disabled citizens of State 
signatories to the Social Charters. 
While the remaining provisions under both the ESC 1961 and the ESC (R) 1996 cover 
both able-bodied and disabled people within their specific remit of application, 47  the 
following articles are of particular relevance to the rights and freedoms of people with 
disabilities: 
 
ESC 1961 48 
 
The right to vocational guidance (Article 9)  
The right to vocational training (Article 10)  
The right to social and medical assistance (Article 13) 
The right to benefit from social welfare services (Article 14)  
The right of physically or mentally disabled persons to vocational training, rehabilitation and 
social resettlement (Article 15)  
The right of the family to social, legal and economic protection (Article 16) 
 
ESC(R)  1996 
 
Disabled persons have the right to independence, social integration and participation in the 
life of the Community (Article 15 - amended)49 
                                                 
45
 See, R Whittle, 'The Question of Resources and the Application of Disability Rights', supra f.n. 
26 at 228. 
 
46
 See, R Whittle, 'Disability Discrimination and the Amsterdam Treaty', 23 European Law 
Review, 1998, 1, 50, at p. 55 (published prior to the re-numbering of the Treaty articles).  
Moreover it is arguable that, in light of the Amsterdam Treaty, the European Commission can 
now adopt a more progressive approach to Community legislation concerning 'health' matters.  
Such an approach may be justified through reliance on other terms in the Treaty such as 
'quality of life' (Article 2) and 'social exclusion' (Articles 136 and 137); terms that would 
certainly encompass issues relating to disability benefits and support services (for example) 
when used in conjunction with the term 'health'. 
   
47
 With the exception of Article 15 under both Social Charters which specifically limits its 
application to people with disabilities.  
 
48
 It should be noted that each of the following provisions of the ESC 1961 have been accepted 
by the government of the United Kingdom. 
 
49
 Fully in line with the equality of opportunity approach to disability rights, Article 15 is clearly the most 
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All workers have the right to dignity at work (Article 26 - new) 
Everyone has the right to protection against poverty and social exclusion (Article 30 - new)  
Everyone has the right to housing (Article 31 - new)  
 
2.2. Instruments emanating from the European Union 
 
To date there are fifteen countries that have signed the European Community Treaty50 and together 
constitute the membership of the European Union.  By attributing their sovereign rights in certain fields of 
policy to the Community Institutions, each Member State has acknowledged and validated the existence of a 
binding and autonomous legal system that transcends State boundaries and is unique at an international level. 
 In contrast to the other systems of international law discussed above and in Part I, European Community 
law possesses a comprehensive and pervasive monitoring and enforcement mechanism that is both 
accessible to the individual, and supported by effective powers of sanction.  In this regard, the European 
Union is therefore superior to the other international organisations identified throughout Part I and II of this 
article. 
At the highest level, this monitoring and enforcement mechanism enables the acts 
and/or omissions of a Community Institution to be reviewed directly before the European 
Court of Justice.  This process of judicial review may be initiated either at the suit of 
individuals, groups of individuals, Member States, or other Community Institutions (Articles 
230 and 232).  In light of the recent amending Treaty of Amsterdam, this ability to review 
the acts of the Community Institutions has particular relevance to people with disabilities.  
In this respect (as suggested elsewhere) disabled nationals of a Member State may in the 
future be able to challenge those Community measures (based upon Article 95 of the Treaty) 
that have implications for, but fail to adequately consider, the needs of disabled people within 
their design.51  
At another level, a facility exists whereby both the European Commission and the 
Member States may eventually take a State Party that is failing to meet its obligations under 
Community law before the Court of Justice (Articles 226 and 227 respectively). The Court of 
Justice may then direct the Contracting State to comply with its obligations and may impose a 
large cumulative fine as a penalty for its failure to do so (Article 228).  
The need to initiate the above monitoring and enforcement mechanisms will typically 
arise when the Community Institutions act within their delegated fields of competence and 
thereby create or extend existing obligations upon either themselves, Member States, or 
                                                                                                                                                        
significant provision within the ESC(R) 1996 from a disability perspective.  It should be noted, however, that, 
like a number of other articles within the Social Charters, Contracting States have the option as to whether or not 
they wish to be bound by the obligations that Article 15 would impose upon them. 
 
50
 Treaty of Rome 1957 as amended by the Single European Act 1986, the Treaty on European Union 1992, and 
the Amsterdam Treaty 1997.  The Amsterdam Treaty came into force on the 1st of May 1999.  Please note that 
the treaty articles referred to in this section of the paper are based upon the new numbering system introduced by 
the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
51
 See, R Whittle, 'Disability Discrimination and the Amsterdam Treaty', supra.  In light 
of the ever increasing profile of human rights within the Community, it would now 
seem appropriate for the Court of Justice to interpret the case law requirements for an 
individual to have sufficient legal standing to challenge the Community Institutions by 
judicial review in a less restrictive manner. 
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natural or legal persons.  Such action by the Community Institutions can provide a supreme 
source of law capable of furnishing 'justiciable' rights to individuals before their national 
courts.   
However, the ability to enforce Community law against a natural or legal person (as 
opposed to a State) directly before national courts is restricted to those measures complying 
with the requirements to be self-executing (see Part I). Moreover EC Directives (one form of 
binding measure) that meet with those requirements can only be enforced, due to their 
particular nature, against the State or emanations thereof.  Nevertheless, both Directives and 
other forms of Community law that cannot 'directly' be enforced before national courts 
against either private parties and/or the State, may still provide the individual with 
enforceable rights through an indirect channel.  Under the Von Colson principle, national 
courts are obliged to construe national law in line with Community law as far as possible 
without an undue straining of the words in a domestic statute.52 Reliance would therefore be 
placed upon the new interpretation of the national statute and, consequently, Community law 
would be enforced through the 'backdoor'.53 In the context of disability discrimination (for 
example) national statutes such as the United Kingdom’s Disability Discrimination Act 1995, 
the Irish Employment Equality Act 1998 and Equal Status Bill (revised), and the relevant 
draft legislation in Sweden and the Netherlands,54 have a clear potential application in this 
regard. 
In practice, the majority of complaints regarding alleged breaches of Community law 
are today adequately dealt with by national courts. Moreover, in the event that national courts 
are unclear as to the principles or scope of Community law, the preliminary reference 
procedure under Article 234 allows guidance and clarification in this respect to be sought 
from Court of Justice.  This facility therefore provides the individual with an indirect access 
to the Court of Justice when other direct avenues (such as Articles 230 and 232, above) are 
not available. 
This accessibility, therefore, of the monitoring and enforcement mechanism (a 
mechanism ultimately enforceable through the Court of Justice) contributes to a legal 
structure that has greater potential than the other forms of transnational law discussed thus far 
to impose changes in the laws of recalcitrant States and to bring about an improvement in the 
rights and freedoms of disabled citizens within the European Union.55   
However, while substantial, this potential is limited at present because the general 
right to equality under Community law has not yet been extended to include a prohibition of 
discrimination based on disability.  Although the Court of Justice has developed human 
                                                 
52
 Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR. 1891. 
 
53
 One should note that a natural or legal person may also claim damages from the State for its 
failure either to implement a Community measure, or to implement it correctly; see in this 
respect Cases C-6 and 9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy [1991] ECR. I-5357. 
 
54
 See in this respect, Sweden’s proposed Bill against discrimination in working life on grounds 
of disability, and the proposed Bill in the Netherlands on the prohibition of making an 
unjustifiable distinction on the grounds of handicap or chronic disease. 
 
55
 A potential that is particularly important in light of the future enlargement of the Union. 
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rights protection within its jurisprudence on the 'general principles' of Community law, such 
protection has not yet encompassed the right to equality of opportunity for this population 
group.  Nonetheless, despite this current limitation, the prohibition of discrimination under 
the existing general right to equality includes both 'direct' and 'indirect' forms of 
discrimination 56  and would also allow 'affirmative action measures' under certain 
circumstances.57 A suitable foundation therefore exists within the jurisprudence of the Court 
of Justice to enable an aggressive judicial policy aimed at combating discrimination based on 
disability.  
First, however, such a policy must be within the scope of the Community treaties and 
it is in this context that the amending Treaty of Amsterdam is most significant. The ability of 
the Community Institutions to introduce secondary or delegated legislation on the basis of the 
primary Treaty provisions is another important distinction between Community law and the 
international instruments and organisations discussed above and in Part I. In effect, the 
adoption of secondary legislation or the development of the general principle of equality in 
the context of non-discrimination for people with disabilities would impose a legal regime in 
this area of human rights that is superior to national law; a regime that must then be reflected 
within the domestic legal systems of the Member States. 
This legislative ability is aptly illustrated by the Article 13 of the Treaty, which 
provides a clear legislative basis for the introduction of secondary legislation to combat, inter 
alia, disability based discrimination, thus: 
 
'Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the limits 
of the powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination 
based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, or 
sexual orientation (Emphasis added).' 
 
While the limitations and potential benefits surrounding Article 13 (both legislative 
and jurisprudential) have been discussed elsewhere,58 encouragement may be gained from 
                                                 
56
 See Case 170/84 Bilka-Kaufhaus Gmbh v. Weber von Harz [1986] ECR 1607.  It is 
suggested that any further developments at a Community level - legislative or jurisprudential - 
in protecting the right to non-discrimination for people with disabilities should incorporate the 
test employed in Case C-237/94 John O'Flynn v. Adjudication Officer [1996] ECR I-2617 to 
identify indirect forms of discrimination; a test more appropriate in combating discrimination 
on grounds such as disability.  
 
57
 Case 13/63 Italy v. Commission [1963] ECR 31.  Although the uncertainty surrounding the 
further development of affirmative action measures at a Community level in the context of 
human rights is demonstrated by the recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (CF. 
Case-C409/95 Hellmut Marshall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen with Case C-450/93 E. 
Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen ECR I-3051) and the inclusion of a new fourth paragraph 
in Article 141 (concerning gender discrimination) by the Amsterdam Treaty.  This paragraph 
merely allows for the introduction of such measures by Member States under limited 
circumstances. 
58
 R Whittle, 'Disability Discrimination and the Amsterdam Treaty', supra.  For a discussion 
concerning the practical application of Article 13 to people with disabilities in the context of 
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obiter dicta in a recent decision by the Court of Justice.  In Lisa Jacqueline Grant v. 
South-West Trains Ltd,59 the Court, while holding that the treaty - at the time the case was 
heard - did not encompass protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation, 
purposely left open the possibility of a full equality jurisprudence developing after the 
Amsterdam Treaty had come into effect.  Given that the Treaty of Amsterdam has recently 
come into operation, it is clear that sexual orientation, and therefore disability and the other 
grounds of discrimination listed within Article 13, are now within the scope of the Treaty.  
One should note, however, that if the general principle of equality in the context of 
human rights is limited to Article 13's remit of application, then, due to that Article's 
particular wording, the general principle cannot be described as being 'open-ended' in nature.  
This is in contrast, therefore, to the ICCPR (see Part I), the ECHR, and the Social Charters.  
Moreover, as the grounds of discrimination listed within Article 13 do not conclude with the 
words 'or other status' it would also appear that the Community’s general principle of equality, 
in the context of human rights, cannot be described as being non-exhaustive in nature.  In 
contrast, therefore, with the other principle binding instruments considered in both Part I and 
II of this article.60 
In developing the general principle of equality or formulating a legislative measure to 
combat disability based discrimination, it would be open to the Court of Justice and the 
Community Institutions to make reference to the other international instruments that have a 
bearing on the rights and freedoms of disabled people.  Thus, the new Article 6 of the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU) directs the Court of Justice to refer to both the ECHR and the 
constitutional traditions of the Member States in determining what may or may not constitute 
a 'fundamental right'.61 In addition, both the new fourth paragraph in the Preamble to the 
Maastricht Treaty and Article 136 encouragingly confirm the Member States' commitment to 
fundamental social rights as set out in the ESC 1961 and in the Community Charter of the 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 1989 ('The Community Charter').62 
                                                                                                                                                        
the recent legislative commitment by the European Commission in respect of 
non-discrimination, see, R Whittle, (1999) Disability Rights and the Amsterdam Treaty: the 
way forward. Annual General Assembly of the European Disability Forum, Brussels, E.D.F. 
 
59
 Case C-249/96 (1998) at para 47-48. 
 
60
 Although it should be noted that certain grounds of discrimination listed within Article 13, 
such as 'belief' for example, may well be given a purposive interpretation to include matters 
such as 'political opinion'.  The grounds of discrimination listed within Article 13 may, 
therefore, be more extensive than they would first appear. 
 
61
 One should note that an amendment to Article L (now Article 46 of the TEU) by the 
Amsterdam Treaty expressly provides jurisdiction to the Court of Justice to review compliance 
of the acts of the institutions with Article 6 in so far as it has jurisdiction under the Community 
Treaties and the revised Title VI of the Treaty on European Union.  Article 46 TEU, as far as 
the first pillar is concerned, simply codifies the existing case law position recently confirmed 
in Case C-299/95, Kremzow v. Austria [1997] E.C.R. I-2629  The Court's jurisdiction in this 
respect has particular relevance to a judicial review action based on Articles 230 and 232, 
discussed in R Whittle, 'Disability Discrimination and the Amsterdam Treaty', supra. 
 
62
 Note also that both the ECHR and the European Social Charter 1961 are referred to in the 
preamble to the Single European Act 1986. 
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In terms of the Community Charter it is worth noting that, although non-binding in 
nature, the majority of Member States have agreed to it and it therefore constitutes a clear 
declaration by those States in the context of workers rights.  Moreover, by establishing 
certain fundamental principles in the social arena for workers, the Community Charter has 
empowered the European Commission to take appropriate measures in order to both 
implement the rights that it enumerates and to prepare annual reports on its application in the 
Member States.  Furthermore, in providing the basis for the Agreement on Social Policy, its 
main provisions63 were effectively incorporated into Community law via the Treaty's new 
social provisions, as amended at Amsterdam.64 These provisions arguably provide the most 
promising basis for the introduction of secondary legislation protecting the rights and 
freedoms of people with disabilities, albeit limited in their application to matters ostensibly 
relating to the concept of 'worker' or the 'working environment'.65 
The Community Charter, therefore, is likely to play an important part in the 
furtherance of social policy and law within the Community and this, in turn, will have a 
significant bearing on the rights and interests of disabled citizens of the European Union.  Of 
particular relevance in this respect, Article 26 of the Community Charter provides:  
 
'Whatever the nature of disablement, disabled persons are entitled to concrete 
measures to improve their social and occupational integration, especially 
vocational training, ergonomics, accessibility, transport and housing 
(Emphasis added).' 
 
The Treaty references to the ECHR, the ESC 1961, and the Community Charter, 
clearly underline the existing case law concerning the Treaty and the application of those 
international instruments to human rights.  One may therefore extrapolate the inferences that 
we have made in relation to those instruments in the context of disability, and place such 
inferences within a European Community dimension.  However, it remains unclear as to the 
extent that the Community Institutions can employ the instruments of global international 
law (GIL)  - discussed in Part I - in developing Community jurisprudence or legislative 
action in the field of equality of opportunity.66 There appears no reason in principle for 
restricting the Community Institutions, when seeking guidance in this respect, to refer only to 
those documents emanating from the Council of Europe.  At the very least, it is arguable that 
the phrase 'constitutional traditions of Member States' contained in the new Article 6 of the 
TEU would also include those elements under GIL that may be considered as 'customary 
international law'.  In this regard, and in terms of disability rights, encouragement can be 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
63
 See, B Bercusson, 'The European Community's Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of 
Workers', 53 Modern Law Review, 1990, 624. 
 
64
 See in this respect, Articles 136-45 of the Treaty. 
 
65
 See, R Whittle, 'Disability Discrimination and the Amsterdam Treaty', supra. 
 
66
 Reference was made to the ICCPR by the Court of Justice in Lisa Jacqueline Grant v. 
South-West Trains Ltd, op cit., at para’s 43-47. 
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gained from the recent non-binding instruments emanating from both the European 
Commission and the Council of the European Union67 endorsing the application of UN 
Standard Rules on the Equalisation of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities (discussed 
in Part I of this article). 
 
Conclusions 
 
This two part article has aimed to demonstrate that while there is, at present, no single 
human rights instrument constituting a binding, accessible, and self-executing measure in the 
context of disability rights, there does exist a complex, though workable, transnational legal 
framework through which such an instrument may evolve.  A progressive measure in this 
regard would, we suggest, encompass both civil and political, and social and economic rights 
that are self-executing in nature.  Such an instrument would be further enhanced if 
accompanied by appropriate affirmative action measures.  
The process involved in developing such an instrument will require, inter alia, a 
comprehensive understanding and recognition of the existing potential of transnational law in 
both the protection and further advancement of disability rights.  This two part article has 
sought to contribute to that understanding.  In this respect, the concluding remarks made in 
relation to the relevant instruments of global international law (GIL) in Part I are equally 
applicable to those of European international Law (EIL) considered here in Part II.  We 
emphasise again, therefore, the importance of national and international NGOs vigorously 
pursuing the supervisory, and where appropriate, the enforcement mechanisms of such 
instruments, and we also stress the practical utility of those provisions (within binding 
international measures) that are self-executing in nature. 
As a system of law, it would appear that European Community law holds greater 
promise for disabled citizens of Europe than the instruments that have emanated from the 
Council of Europe to date (see above) and those considered under GIL in Part I.  It clearly 
provides the most appropriate international system for both the promotion and the policing of 
a comprehensive legislative package in this respect within the European region; a package 
that has the greatest potential to be translated into national law and policy.68  The recent 
amendments to the treaties of the European Community by the Amsterdam Treaty provide a 
clear and encouraging step in this direction. 
In the context of non-discrimination, it is submitted that a focus should be placed 
                                                 
67
 See in this respect the Commission's Communication on Equality of opportunity for people 
with disabilities - a new European Community disability strategy (1996) Com 406 final and 
Council Resolution on equality of opportunity for people with disabilities, 1996, (97/C 12/01), 
OJ C 12 Vol 40 13 January 1997. 
68
 The significance of this potential is particularly apparent when one considers that if 
Community action in the area of disability rights took a progressive stance towards the concept 
of 'reasonable accommodation' (for example), it would effectively overturn the recent decision 
by the Irish Supreme Court which prevented the adoption of Ireland’s  'Employment Equality' 
and 'Equal Status' Bills proposed during 1997.  See in this respect, In the matter Article 26 of 
the Constitution of Ireland and in the Matter of the Employment Equality Bill, Judgement of 
the Supreme Court, 1997. Given that both Bills had attracted cross party support favouring 
their adoption, it is unlikely that the Irish Government would react in a negative manner 
towards a legislative proposal from the European Commission in this regard.  
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upon the economic dimension of the Community and the importance that it attaches to 
regulating the common market.  It is this importance that has provided the catalyst for the 
development of those factors that distinguish European Community law from the other 
systems of international law considered throughout Part I and II of this article.  Given that 
equality of opportunity and non-discrimination underpin, rather than undermine market 
rationality, we suggest that it is this dimension that should be harnessed by disability NGOs in 
Europe.  In this respect, it is clear that the existence of discrimination limits both 
competition and the growth of economic markets and that these markets will, in the absence 
of regulation, continue to discriminate.69 Moreover, added 'Community value' in the context 
of the labour market, tax revenues, welfare costs and consumer activity would also accrue 
from the implementation of effective measures combating discrimination.   European 
disability NGOs should therefore focus on these benefits when lobbying at both a national 
and international level for Community intervention to combat disability based discrimination. 
That is not to ignore, however, the individual potential of those GIL and EIL 
instruments that have emanated from organisations external to the European Community.  
As demonstrated throughout Part I and II of this article, these instruments may conceivably 
play a significant role in the further advancement of the rights and freedoms of disabled 
people.   We stress, therefore, that any further development at Community level (legislative 
or jurisprudential) in combating disability discrimination should not proceed without a full 
appreciation of all relevant GIL and EIL instruments protecting human rights.  Clearly the 
campaigning vitality and intelligent advocacy of international disability organisations and 
NGO pressure groups will undoubtedly play a vital role in this regard.  Disability NGOs 
have already served to enhance the visibility of international law and to underline its potential 
as a force to regulate and further develop human rights in this area.  One positive outcome of 
their continued advocacy and lobbying across both GIL and EIL contexts may well be the 
recognition, in the near future, of disability discrimination being classified as 'internationally 
suspect'; a classification that would then be in line with the other well recognised grounds of 
discrimination such as race and gender. 
In light of the developing global recognition of the need to combat disability based 
discrimination in recent years, it is likely that transnational law, and European Community 
law in particular, will form a key element in pushing forward the positive frontiers of equality 
in the years to come. The time is now ripe for disability NGOs to exploit that potential. 
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 See in this respect, C Sunstein, 'Why Markets Don't Stop Discrimination', 8 Soc. Phil. and Pol., 
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